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 Gloria María Álvarez1 
 
Abstract 
International Investment Law is constantly changing; therefore the mechanisms available to 
solve its disputes have evolved. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) is the most important arbitral institution capable of administrate disputes 
between investors and member States of the Washington Convention. The annulment 
activity of ICSID awards has significantly increased in recent years. This paper explores all 
the variables affecting the annulment activity and suggests effective solutions in order to 
achieve the desirable Finality Principle in ICSID awards. 
Key Words: Investments, World Bank, Annulment activity, Finality Principle, ICSID, 
Washington Convention, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Argentina, Vivendi and Sempra 
 
Resumen 
El Derecho Internacional de Inversión, está en constante desarrollo, por lo tanto, los 
mecanismos disponibles para solucionar sus controversias también han evolucionado. El 
Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (CIADI), es la 
institución arbitral más importante en la materia, capaz de administrar controversias entre 
Inversionistas y Estados Miembros de la Convención de Washington. La anulación en 
laudos del CIADI ha aumentado dramáticamente en el reciente año, por esta razón, el 
presente artículo explora las diferentes variables que afectan la actividad de laudos 
anulados, así como propone soluciones eficaces para conseguir un principio de finalidad 
deseable en laudo arbitrales finales.  
Palabras Clave: Inversiones, Banco Mundial, Anulación de Laudos, Principio de Finalidad, 
Convención de Washington, Tratados Bilaterales de Inversión, Argentina, Vivendi y 
Sempra.  
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Introduction and Foundations 
 
Introduction  
International Investments between governments of developing countries and foreign private 
investors with the capacity to assist developing countries are an essential activity for the 
growth of any economy.2 Investment transactions contribute immensely to utilize resources 
in a more efficient way by achieving benefits for the host governments of the investment and 
for the investors. 
Worldwide organisations, institutions, chambers and rules among other structures have 
been created to improve, regulate and discuss the International Investment activity. To 
illustrate this, we can observe the World Bank, a financial institution, based in Washington, 
D.C., composed by one hundred and eighty seven shareholders, all of them called Member 
Countries3. One of the World Bank‘s primary objectives is to retrieve inconsistencies in the 
International Investment framework. This purpose becomes an important incentive when the 
investment is addressed to the economic progression of a developing country, where raw 
material such as manpower and natural resources are present but there is lack of capital 
and technology, which is usually possessed by the most industrialized countries. 
Economical, environmental, political, legal and even cultural facts interact in all international 
investments; thus disputes between a State and an investor have always existed and are a 
latent possibility. All these potential obstacles increased the concern and aid the search for 
mechanisms capable of settling disputes among Sates and investors.  
Furthermore, the absence of an appropriate forum for the settlement of disputes that would 
be reliable for international investors and the investment‘s host States used to present a 
severe obstruction to the encouragement of investments in developing countries, which 
motivated the international community to find a suitable solution capable of settling disputes 
on a neutral forum.4 
Thus, in accordance with the World Bank proposal and in response to the absence of an 
institution specialised on the administration of investment disputes; in 1966 the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was founded as an independent 
organisation. ICSID counts with more than 150 member countries, all of them signatories of 
the Washington Convention (hereinafter the Convention), this body of rules is considered as 
                                                          
2
 Christoph Scheruer, ―The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System‖ in Rainer Hofmann and 
Christian J. Tams (eds.), The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: 
Taking a Stock after 40 Years (Europäischen Integration und Internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung, 7 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007) 15 
3
For More information about the World Bank go to 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~th
eSitePK:29708,00.html accessed on 22 July, 2011.  
4
  Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 17  
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a step forward in the investment dispute dynamic,5 this multilateral treaty has been recently 
ratified by the countries of Qatar and Moldova.6                                                                                                              
As mentioned before, the lack of an investment arbitration institution motivated the creation 
of the Centre, whose main objective was solving any potential international investment 
disputes that could arise. The uniqueness of this Centre in comparison with other arbitral 
institutions is that is designed (as well as limited) to address investment controversies 
claimed only by certain category of parties: a sovereign member state and a private investor 
(from another contracting state). In practice the investor is usually a multinational 
corporation,7 but also individuals can request a claim under ICSID arbitration.8 
ICSID provides the administration of conciliation and arbitral investment proceedings. The 
creation of the Centre by the World Bank has been an incentive for the investment 
community, especially because it provides a set of accurate provisions carefully drafted, ‗so 
as to blend the procedures of the common law with those of the civil law‘ 9 named ICSID 
Arbitration Rules (ICSID Rules). These Rules along with the Convention, improved the 
settlement of the investment disputes‘ atmosphere. This improvement can be seen on the 
increasing amount of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) where consent to arbitrate under 
Washington Convention or/and Additional Facility Rules can be found.  So far, more than 
2,400 BITs10 contain ICSID arbitration as a forum choice among other arbitration 
institutions11 Additionally, another convincing factor of having an arbitral institution 
sponsored by the World Bank is the pressure parties face in complying with the award; as 
can be found on the World Bank Operational Manual12: 
“[w]hen a dispute over default, expropriation, or 
governmental breach of contract comes to the attention of a 
Bankstaff member ...  If, on this basis, the Regional vice 
president (RVP) decides not to make any new loans to the 
                                                          
5
 Scheruer (n 1) 17 
6
 List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention <www.worldbank.org/icsid> 
accessed on12 July 2011 
7
 Hirsch ( n 3)  2 
8
 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) Award November 13, 
2000 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConclu
ded> accessed on 12 July 2011 
9
 Alan Redfern, ―ICSID – Losing its Appeal?‖, 3 (1987) Arb.Int'l 2  98 
10
 Haley St. Dennis, The Elephant in the room: Addressing International Investment Conditions to 
Improve Human Rights. Institute for Human Rights and Business (SOAS) 
<http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/elephant_in_the_room.html>, accessed on 22 July 2011 
11
 See as an example Energy Charter Treaty article 26 (4), Jordan- Russian Federation BIT, 
Germany- Oman BIT, Qatar- Turkey BIT, Finland- Ethiopia BIT, Thailand-Argentine BIT, US-Estonia 
BIT, Netherlands- Venezuela BIT, Spain-Venezuela BIT, Germany-Cameroon BIT, UK-Egypt BIT, 
US- Argentina BIT and France-Argentina BIT, et al. 
12
 World Bank Operational Manual on Disputes over Default on External Debts, Expropriation, and 
Breach of Contract available on 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,cont
entMDK:20064641~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.h
tml>  accessed 07 July 2011 
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member country or with the guarantee of the country, the 
RVP informs the relevant managing director and the Vice 
President and General Counsel. It is clearly seen that the 
World Bank legislate this manual in order to promote the 
voluntary fulfilment of ICSID awards” 
There are other reasons that strengthen ICSID awards. Unlike awards enforced and 
recognized under the New York Convention (1958), ICSID is described as a „self-contained 
system‟13 excluding the awards from any revision procedure not considered on the remedies 
available in the Washington Convention itself. This Convention does not establish any 
grounds where an ICSID award may be refused by a national court. It seems, that drafters 
of the Washington Convention tried to shield the final decisions made by the Arbitral 
Tribunals. Nevertheless, drafters left available to the parties an annulment mechanism. 
 
Despite the fact of the mentioned ICSID advantages, experts recently have considered, that 
ICSID has achieved its purpose without overcoming high expectations regarding the Finality 
Principle. In contrast, there is the opinion that ICSID has brought to the investment field an 
important development of the law and argues that ICSID should be recognized for all the 
innovations to this special arbitration regime and unsuccessful experiences should be 
considered positively as teaching lessons for the future.14   
All recent criticisms to ICSID, point out the (i) ambiguity on the Finality Principle and (ii) lack 
of effectiveness of the awards. Nevertheless, not all criticisms attribute ambiguity and lack 
of effectiveness to the same causes, neither give the same solutions. 
The ambiguity on the Finality Principle can be found in the internal mechanism offered to 
review and annul an award. The mechanism basically offers to any of the parties the 
possibility to apply for the annulment of the award through an internal ICSID procedure. The 
application for the annulment is heard by a group of experts different fromthe Arbitral 
Tribunal; named Ad hoc committee. Here is when lack of effectiveness appears because 
every time an award is rendered it can be subject to annulment and as consequence the 
dispute can be restarted immediately AMCO v Indonesia II15and Vivendi v Argentina 
II16among other cases17are examples of annulment and resubmission of the dispute. 
                                                          
13
 Christoph H. Schereuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinsh, Antony Sinclair, The ICSID 
Convention: A commentary (2
nd
 ed. Cambridge University Press 2009) 1102 
14
 Hirsh (n 3) 155  
15
 Amco Asia Corporation and others v Republic of Indonesia, Resubmission Proceeding 24 June 
2011 (hereinafter Amco v Indonesia II),5 Int'l Arb. Rep., No. 11 
16
 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Unversal S.A. v Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case Arb/97/03), Resubmission Proceeding (hereinafter Vivendi v Argentina II) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConclu
ded> accessed on 10 June 2011 
17
 Pending cases:  Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3) (hereinafter Enron v 
Argentina), Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) 
(hereinafter Sempra v Argentina) both available on 
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One of the most popular causes of the overactive annulment activity according to 
investment experts is the lack of consistent criteria through the ICSID generations and this 
is perfectly reflected on the lack of precedents. In other words, ICSID has developed rapidly 
over the last three generations, by means of their annulment activity. As a result of this and 
despite the lack of precedents, these generations established criteria concerning the scope 
of the Ad hoc committee regarding annulment decisions. But, just in 2010, four ICSID 
awards were annulled and none of the established annulment criteria were completely 
followed, opening the possibility for a fourth generation facing procedural challenges.  
A more delicate and polarising opinion says that annulment should be seen as an extreme 
measure18 and not used as an appeal mechanism. Several and very different opinions can 
be found regarding the possibility of implementing an appeal mechanism on ICSID 
procedure. As stated earlier, ICSID was created with the effort of the World Bank, and it 
counts with an important number of signatory States. Because of the type of parties 
involved on this investment procedure any ―defect‖ on the annulment mechanism is worth to 
be analysed and the investment community should offer a modest solution. The settlement 
of investment disputes raises complex issues of law and procedure that deserve to be 
solved.19 
 
Foundations 
The aim of this article is to shed light on the elements contributing to the procedural 
loopholes impacting the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
annulment activity in order to find solutions easy of being implemented.  
The working hypothesis of this paper is to demonstrate that these elements are distinctive 
features affecting the annulment activity with the aim to find a procedural solution capable of 
retrieving the inconsistencies presented on the ICSID procedure. 
First, we must review the arbitral mechanism to understand under which circumstances 
awards are rendered; this will prepare us for the next stage of discussion about ICSID 
challenges and its possible solutions. We will also analyse some of the inconsistences 
presented all along the three (and fourth) generations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPendin
g> accessed on 13 July 2011. 
Concluded cases:  KlöcknerIndustrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and 
SociétéCamerounaise des Engrais (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2) (hereinafter Klockner v Cameroon),  
Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4) 
(hereinafter MINE v Guinea) both available on 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConclu
ded> accessed 13 July, 2011, Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), ‗Maritime International Nominees 
Establishment (MINE) v. The Republic of Guinea‘ Final award of 6 January 1988 (1989) XIVYBCA  
82  
18
 Christoper Scheruer, ‗Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings‘ in Emmanuel Galliard 
and Yas Banifatemi, (eds),  Annulment of ICSID Awards (IAI Series, Jurish Publishing, Inc. 2004). 
19
 Audley Sheppard and Hugo Warner. Editorial Note. Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty 
Awards: Is it time for an International Appellate System? [2005] 2/2 BIICL  3 
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In the second chapter we will focus on all the procedural features affecting the annulment 
activity. At first, the discussion will be dedicated to an analysis of lack of jurisprudence 
discussion and its interaction with the annulment activity. Secondly we shall look at the 
behaviour of the Ad hoc committee and how easy it is to erase the differentiation line 
between been a court of appeal and  a court of annulment and what are the  consequences 
of doing it. Third, we will observe the gaps after an award has been rendered and before the 
annulment application has been made. As a fourth point, we will observe the interaction of 
the Bilateral Investment Treaties towards the annulment activity and how they are 
responding to this procedural gap. Lastly, we will consider the Argentinian experience as the 
member state facing the largest number of procedures under ICSID.  
The third chapter will focus on the divergent opinions the investment community has 
regarding the procedural challenges the Centre is facing. This topic has been the subject 
matter of several debates in different forums all around the world by academics, 
practitioners, arbitrators and ICSID staff.  
At the final chapter, we shall present conclusions reached on the basis of the analysis of the 
ICSID procedure, development of the annulment generations, the limits between court of 
appeal and annulment, the lack of jurisprudence, the contribution of the BITs, the 
Argentinian experience and the feedback of ICSID users have on this matter. 
Is important to bear in mind that during the development and at the outset of the study, 
according to the Convention, the Centre cannot publish an award without the consent of the 
parties, therefore some information is restricted and a complete and substantial analysis of 
the material was difficult.  
Chapter I 
1.1  The Arbitral Procedure at ICSID 
By December 2011, ICSID had register 331 cases20 a small number in comparison with 
other arbitration institutions. ICSID arbitration procedure contains particular feature21such as 
a neutral and self-contained system (i), increasing transparency (ii) and a clear and (iii) 
reasonable cost schedules. 
The neutral and self-contained system contains two important elements, the first is stated 
on the Washington Convention, establishes that the ‗law of the seat has no impact 
whatsoever on the proceedings‘22, the second relevant element as it will be analysed 
carefully, regards the internal mechanism for the rectification, interpretation, revision and 
annulment where ICSID awards are ―final‖ and they are not subject to any appeal or review 
by national courts.   
                                                          
20
ICSID Caseload Statistics Issue 2011-1 , available on 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStati
stics> accessed 07 July 2011 
21
 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson and  Nigel Blackaby. Guide to ICSID Arbitration. (Kluwer International 
Law, 2006)  ch 1, 13  
22
 ibid 14 
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Rules 32(2) and 37(2) of ICSID Arbitration rules promote the increasing transparency on the 
Centre. ICSID offers the possibility for non-disputes parties to attend the oral 
hearings .giving the opportunity to member States (especially developing countries) to show 
them as friendly investment States and capable to make public its legal duties and rights on 
a legal proceeding23.  
Finally, the clear and reasonable cost schedules, ICSID administrative fees are relatively 
low, and provide a transparent cost structure. However, the rates for the Arbitral Tribunal, 
Conciliators and Ad hoc committee are considerable, especially if the procedure lasts for a 
long time and then if it faces a first or even a second annulment; the fix rate, per day, can be 
of $3,000.00 USD, in addition to certain allowances and reimbursement of expenses.24 
ICSID‘s Arbitration Procedure follows the same basic procedural standards of any other 
relevant international arbitration institution concerning features like: the appointment of 
arbitrators, time management and the figure of the Secretary General and its supervision 
duties which plays an important position also in ICC arbitrations.  
 Before understanding the internal annulment mechanism of ICSID, it is important to review 
the arbitral procedure. As mentioned before, overall the arbitration procedure of the Centre 
follows the same structure as in any other arbitration institution, thus we should focus on the 
particularities of the procedure rather than the similarities.  
First, any party can file a written Request for Arbitration to the Secretary General of the 
Centre as stated on Article 36(1) of the Convention, cases of a host State as the claimant 
has been very rarely seen, usually it is the investor who claims its rights in arbitration. This 
request shall contain all relevant information concerning the issues of the dispute.  
It can be said that in order to grant the request of arbitration, on a prima facie stage the 
Secretary-General will considerer if the Centre has jurisdiction over the dispute, according 
to the pre requisites provided in Article 25 of the ICSID Rules. The main objective of this 
initial scrutiny is to avoid that the arbitration mechanism can be used to consider irrelevant 
claims that clearly do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre. If after the ‗pre-prima facie‖ 
stage scrutiny the Secretary does not grant the jurisdiction over the claim, this decision 
cannot be challenged in any forum; this is an exclusive power granted to the Secretary-
General in this stage of the proceedings, and the rejection is a drastic but effective fence to 
access arbitration proceedings at the Centre.  Nevertheless, at a later stage the Arbitral 
Tribunal will do a more careful revision on the jurisdiction requirements in order to determine 
if they in fact have authority over the dispute.25 
Assuming the Secretary-General finds jurisdiction on the pre prima facie study, the 
Secretary has to proceed to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal.  A series of administrative rather 
than procedural steps have to be followed. First it is necessary to proceed with the 
appointment of the arbitral tribunal. As mentioned earlier the appointment method is like any 
                                                          
23
 Ibid 14 15 
24
 ibid 
25
  Hirsh  (n 3) 41 
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other in the arbitration institution around the world. A default provision can be found on 
Article 37 (2)(b) of the Convention that provides that if the parties do not agree upon the 
number of arbitrators neither on the selection system the Arbitral Tribunal should be 
compounded by three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and the chairman appointed 
by an agreement of the parties. The parties may appoint arbitrators either form the Centre‘s 
panel or from outside the Centre‘s list. Parties should bare in mind a time limit of 90 days 
after notice of registration of the request to appoint the Arbitral Tribunal if not, the Chairman 
of the Administrative Council will appoint at the request of either party, the arbitrator or 
arbitrators who have not yet been appointed.26 
It is worth considering the provision contained on Article 39 of the Convention, which 
provides that ―the majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other than the 
Contracting State party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to 
the dispute”. It can be understood that by this provision, ICSID drafters had the aim of 
constituting tribunals not only composed by experts with a high-level of understanding in the 
arbitration field, but also with neutral opinions towards the ―nationality‖ of the parties 
involved in the dispute.  
After the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, some preliminary steps27 should be taken into 
account:28 the language or languages  to be use in the proceeding which have to be chosen 
from one of the official languages accepted by the Centre;29 it can be English, Spanish or 
French; fixing a certain number of sequence pleadings, expert appointment (including 
amicus curie).30 
The Washington Convention does not include any provision about the applicable 
substantive law of the procedure. At first glance, parties are free and should choose the 
substantive law applicable to the dispute, in absence of this choice by the parties, the 
Arbitral Tribunal will decide. Article 42 of the Convention serves as guidance for the Arbitral 
Tribunal in deciding the applicable law to the dispute, having to consider national and 
international norms.31 Article 42 of the Convention, blends two important procedural 
principles: flexibility and certainty. On the one hand, parties can choose the applicable law 
(Flexibility), and on the other, because in case parties do not comply on choosing the 
applicable law, the Arbitral Tribunal will fill this void (Certainty). Usually, the applicable law is 
that of the host State in concurrence with Private? International Law. 32 
                                                          
26
 R 4 ICSID Arbitration Rules 
27
 ibid R 21  
28
 Ibid R 20  
29
 ibid  R 22  
30
 The most recent application the Centre has had regarding the participation of an amicie curiae, is 
the case Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12) (hereinafter 
Pac Rim), Procedural Order No. 8, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending 
accessed   23 July, 2011. 
31
 Hirsh (n 3) 28 
32
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Applicable Law, Course on 
Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add5_en.pdf> accessed  23  July 2011 
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Washington Convention provides that the law of the place where the proceedings are being 
held does not have any influence on the proceedings, unlike in commercial arbitration. This 
reaffirms one of the most important characteristic of ICISD as neutral, delocalized and 
independent of the nationality of the parties involved. ICSID users can agree the sitting of 
the Tribunal, in absence of choosing a venue to conduct the proceedings; it can be 
conducted in Washington, D.C.33 
Provisional measures play and important role in any arbitration proceedings. The measures 
are often requested to the tribunal, and should be granted in order to protect any legal rights 
involved that can be easily jeopardized during the proceedings. . However, under ICSID 
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal can only ‗recommend‘ provisional measures; 
there is no coercive power from the tribunal to grant the measures as an order or as an 
award.34 Nevertheless, the arbitral tribunal is always vigilant to the behaviour of the parties 
during the proceedings and can take it into account when rendering the final decision. A 
provisional measure granted as a recommendation might contain lack of coactivity and 
therefore lack of enforceability, however there have been some ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 
recommendations with a  ―strongly influence‖35 to national courts. This prohibition is 
consistent with the aim of creating an autonomous judicial mechanism, independent of 
municipal legal systems in order to ensure neutrality.36 
 
After an award has been rendered, a set of post awards remedies are offered by the Centre. 
As described by Alan Redfern37 the provisions of the Convention as to interpretation and 
revision of an award are sensible and non-contentious.  
 
The first option can be found on Article 49(2) of the Convention, supplementation and 
rectification; the remedy is designed for enabling the arbitral tribunal to correct minor 
omissions and technical mistakes and not for a substantive review of the decision.38 
 
In Article 50 of the Washington Convention, there is a second post-award remedy called 
interpretation, a simple ―lack of clarity‖ is not enough to grant the interpretation of the award, 
there must be a real dispute concerning a misunderstanding on reading the decision. There 
is no explicit time limit to request the interpretation (in contrast with the supplementation and 
rectification). It is important to precise which parts of the award are the ones required to be 
interpreted. The only objective of this remedy is to make clear any misunderstandings on 
the meaning of the award. Only the Arbitral Tribunal can exercise this faculty and in the 
case this is not possible, a new tribunal will be constituted.39 
 
                                                          
33
 Hirsh (n 3) 30 
34
 Art 47 Washington Convention 
35
 Albert Jan van den Berg ( n 16 ) 
36
 Hirsch ( n 3) 31 
37
 Redfern (n 8) 4  
38
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Post Award Remedies and 
Procedures, Course on Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual 
Property, available on <www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add7_en.pdf> accessed  23 July 2011 
39
 Ibid  9  
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A third post award remedy is found in Article 51 of the Convention that establishes the 
revision mechanism. This remedy should be requested only when new facts have been 
discovered and this situation would be decisive for altering the sense of the decision 
rendered. The request should be made within the 90 days from the time when the new facts 
were discovered and this right expires 3 years after the award was granted. As in the other 
remedies, the Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to do the revision on the award. 
 
The last remedy for the ICISD awards is the annulment, described on Article 52 of the 
Washington Convention. From a descriptive point of view, the annulment procedure is an 
easy mechanism to understand the consequences and the elements involved on the 
procedure as will be discussed on the following chapters of this article. Meanwhile, is 
important to understand how it works.  
Parties can have 120 days after the award was rendered to request the annulment 
procedure, the application has to be submitted to the Secretary General, and must state all 
the arguments upholding the annulment request. If the application of annulment is granted, 
it is possible that the Ad hoc committee requests that the reasons contained in the 
application have to be exhaustively explained during the remainder of the annulment 
process.   
 
The annulment remedy is a unique characteristic of ICSID arbitrations among other 
arbitration institutions and it possess some advantages.40 The first advantage of this remedy 
as it is drafted consists in that the possibility of annulment encourages arbitrators to render 
an award exhaustively reasoned and grounded. Secondly, the same arbitral tribunal does 
not make the revision of the award, an Ad hoc committee is constituted with greater 
chances of having a new and clearer opinion towards the possible errors of the award. The 
appointment of the Committee is made by the President of the World Bank and the selection 
is done from the Panel of Arbitrations designated by the member States in accordance with 
the Articles 12 to 16 of the Washington Convention. Moreover, the grounds to annul an 
award are not discretion of the Ad hoc committee, these criteria are clearly stated and were 
created to avoid any abuse on exceeding jurisdictional powers or evident injustice,41 the 
grounds are:  
 
‗(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly 
exceed its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member if the 
Tribunal; (d) that there has been serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based‘.42 
 
                                                          
40
 Prof. David D. Caron, Margarete Stevens, Antonio R. Parra and Robert W. Hawkings. Birth of an 
ICSID Case- Act I, Scene I (2008) 24/1 
Arb.Int'l<http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document.aspx?id=ipn28345> accessed on 7 July 2011 
41
 Redfern (n 8) 
42
 Washington Convention Art 52 (1) and Arbitration Rules of ICSID R 50 
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
 
174 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
The annulment proceedings can produce 3 different outcomes:  (1) the application for 
annulment is refused, (2) partial annulment of the award, (3) total annulment of the award. 
In other words, a decision to annul does not replace the award with a new decision.43 The 
consequence of these provisions are that the award is legally destroyed, allowing the 
parties to restart the same dispute on ICSID proceedings. There is only one restriction for 
the appointment of the Ad hoc committee: a member that acted, as a part of the Arbitral 
Tribunal cannot join the Committee unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
 
1.2  Generations Of Setting Aside Proceedings 
In the first 19 years of ICSID, the annulment procedure was never requested.44 In the 
Summer of 2010, four ICSID awards were annulled and none of the established criteria by 
the previous Ad hoc committee was completely followed. This has allowed practitioners to 
refer to it as a ―hot summer for annulments‖45 while others describe it as a ―wake up call‖46 
for the investment community. 
The issue can be understood from the following chart47 were in the past 3 ICISID 
generations, the annulment activity remain steady while since 2001, the activity of the Ad 
hoc committees has risen dramatically.  
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As mentioned earlier, one of the most relevant particularities of an ICSID procedure are the 
remedies in order to review an award. Unlike other awards, made under different arbitration 
rules, awards rendered by ICSID are not entitled to any kind of appeal. In contrast, these 
awards can only be subject of interpretation, revision or annulment.48 While the request of 
interpretation or revision was designed as a frequent remedy for ICSID users, applications 
for annulment are an ―extraordinary remedy‖; 49 this is because, as it was mentioned above, 
when an Ad hoc committee annuls an award the legal consequence is the destruction of the 
award in order to reinitiate a new dispute.50 
In the 1980‘s, the First Generation of annulment started with two cases: Klockner and 
AMCO where both awards were set-aside on the ground that the arbitral tribunals went 
beyond its‘ faculties by failing to state accepted reasons.51 This criteria applied by both ad 
hoc committees developed a wave of criticisms and concerns, when the Ad hoc committee 
decided regarding the lack of reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal, automatically they looked 
into the merits of the dispute, confusing the differences between an appeal and an 
annulment. Moreover, by annulling an award under the grounds of ―exceeding powers‖, it 
was catalogued as a very low criteria to ground an annulment. Thus, the performance of the 
Committees was criticized for two main reasons: the unclear difference between and appeal 
and an annulment body, the concept of finality was distorted, the process was delayed and 
increased the arbitration cost of Klockner and AMCO cases (because they were re-
submitted) by interpreting the decisions of the award on a very broad sense. 
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In the award of Klockner the Arbitral Tribunal decided that the claimant did not comply with 
the contractual obligations, therefore decided that Klockner was not entitled to the amount 
claimed. The investor requested for the annulment of the award, and it was granted 
unanimously by the Ad hoc committee: the arguments were grounded on the fact that the 
award had to be totally annulled because the Arbitral Tribunal did not apply the proper law 
and therefore the entire decision was affected with a wrong choice of applicable law.52 
In AMCO v Indonesia, the Arbitral Tribunal granted a US$3,200,000 award in favour of 
Amco. On March 1985, the respondent - Indonesia- requested the annulment of the final 
decisions, on the grounds used in the Klockner case, subsequently the same arguments 
have been used in almost all the cases on the annulment process history as it was 
announced by Alan Redfern: ‗the grounds on which this annulment was sought were very 
much the same as those in the Klockner case- and they are likely to become commonplace, 
if the fashion for seeking annulment on ICSID awards catches on‟.53  
On the second annulment procedure, the Ad hoc committee studied carefully all the 
arguments presented by Indonesia. Based on the ―excess of powers‖ allegation, the 
Committee held that ‗the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to state reasons 
for its calculation of the amount of investment‘.54 The wrong calculation was attributed to the 
failure of the Tribunal of not fulfil the computing requirements according the applicable law -
Indonesian law-. And this action fell under the ground of manifest violation of the Tribunal‘s 
authority. The agreement stipulated that AMCO would invest US$3,000,000 in the project. 
According to Indonesian law, the investor was required to register the entire amount of the 
investment capital with the Bank of Indonesia. The Committee ruled that the entire amount 
of the investment duly registered consisted only of US$983,992, in contrast to the ruling of 
the tribunal that AMCO invested US$2,472,490. The Committee was of the opinion that the 
deviation from the agreed amount was in fact substantive and justified the termination of the 
agreement by Indonesia.55 
Damages were claim by Amco using as part of the arguments for doing so the revocation of 
a license made by the Government of Indonesia. Aldan Redfren has made a strong criticism 
to the Ad hoc committee considering that its‘ decision as an excess of authority as 
annulment court by enquiring into the merits of a revocation license made by Indonesia to 
Amco. In this commentator‘s opinion the Ad hoc committee lost track of its faculties and the 
limits of its decisions when decided not to grant damages:  
[T]he Tribunal, not forming part of the Indonesia judicial system, could only award 
compensation to P.T. Amco for damages, if any, sustained by it from the revocation 
order. The amount such compensation was of course dependent whether or not the 
revocation was justified on substantive grounds. 
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By enquiring into the merits of the revocation, despite the finding of lack of due process, the 
ad hoc committee appears to have acted as Court of Appeal.56 The consequences of the 
annulment deprived Amco from USD$ 3.2 million. Despite that fact, the Committee 
recognized that the takeover by the army and the hotel‘s police staff was clearly a breach of 
international law, but did not grant for compensation to Amco for such prejudice. 
Furthermore, the Committee did not dissent from the Arbitral Tribunal conclusion that the 
principle of ―due process had not been followed by the relevant Indonesian authority in the 
revocation of the investment licence‖.57 
All in all, the Ad hoc committee studied the substantive dispute rather than sticking to their 
annulment faculties; this case is an example of what an annulment court should not do, 
especially because if ICSID was created to protect foreign investments, the decision of the 
Committee was not at all fulfilling with the proposes of ICSID and the Convention. In 1987, 
Redfern anticipated the decision of AMCO as an open door for a wave of annulments. The 
First Generation, was enough to understand that the function of the Ad hoc committee and 
the mechanism of annulment showed some defects as it can be read from Alan Redfern‘s 
article ―ICSID – Losing its Appeal?‖ but it has took more than one generation to understand 
the fissures on the procedure.  
The Second Generation of annulments started on 1989 and it lasted thirteen years. On this 
second stage, the annulment resolutions tried to hit back the first criticisms when their 
Committees refused the applications for the annulment of AMCO II and Klockner II.  The 
Second Generation can be clearly illustrated by MINE v Guinea;58 in this case the 
respondent -Guinea- applied for the annulment of the proceedings on the portion 
corresponding to the payment of damages to MINE as consequence of a breach of contract 
by Guinea. The Ad hoc committee did a more thorough scrutiny of the final award and 
without exceeding its faculties as an annulment court dismissed the request of Guinea on 
the grounds that it had been a breach of contract. However, it granted the second request 
reasoned on the fact that the Tribunal did not provide an accurate study of the merits of the 
case at the quantum of damages stage; therefore only damages determination was 
annulled.  
On a superficial review, it seems that on the Second Generation the Ad hoc committees 
acted more vigilant by treating the procedure annulment not as an extension of ICSID 
arbitration, but as ―High-Court of Annulment‖ that should be activated only when the 
judgment of the Arbitral Tribunal is notoriously failing under the grounds of ruled on Article 
52 of Washington Convention. At first sight, criticisms can be positive to these generational 
changes. Nevertheless, this was the beginning of uncertainty on the Investment Arbitration 
precedents, this change of criteria between the first and the second generation must have 
been consider as a ―yellow light‖ for the ICSID drafters regarding the necessity of having 
precedents. A couple of questions arise from the assessment of these two generations: Is it 
necessary to have precedents that help us to draw the scope of the role of the Ad hoc 
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committee? Is ICSID contributing to the formation of a coherent legal criteria for 
International Investment Law?. 59 These questions will be examined in the Second Chapter 
(2.1) of this document.  
During the Second and Third Generations, a steadier and more coherent set of criteria for 
the annulment was underway. In 1993, Moshe Hirsh predicted an eloquent stage on the Ad 
Hoc Committees reasoning and stated that -inconsistent decisions from the Ad hoc 
committees may not have a great impacting in the future- unfortunately he fail on this 
prediction. Hirsh suggested that inconsistent rulings of any given Ad hoc Committee should 
not been considered as binding precedent for the futures Ad hoc committees. Hence, 
futures committees will not only need to adopt the wide interpretation given to the grounds 
of annulment in the Convention. Hirsch also asserted on the reasoning of the Third 
Generation Ad hoc committees saying that they would decide that there are no grounds for 
annulling an award due to a mistake in applying the law.  
The Third Generation started on 2002 and rather than analysing it through cases, the 
situation of a particular member state stands out from its participation in the Investment 
Arbitration field: Argentina. The country is currently facing three relevant procedures, one 
against Vivendi Universal, a second one against CMS Gas Transmission, and the third 
case: Wena Hotels v Egypt.60 In the same sequence of criteria the three Ad hoc committees 
gave a most balanced approach about their duties as annulment committee, which means 
that they will not automatically annul an award under very ambiguous criteria, unlike in the 
First Generation. Even if the Ad hoc committee found errors on the final decision. 
Annulment should only be granted in the case of an award containing serious defects.  
The Wena proceeding was under the provisions of the Egypt- UK BIT, all the reasoning 
made by the Committee can be described on the statement that: even when the Arbitral 
Tribunal made a mistake on the award, the Ad hoc Committee should not mechanically 
annul the proceedings, to retrieve the defects made by the Tribunal, as consequence, the 
application for annulment was declined.    
In Compania de Aguas de Aconquija and Vivendi Universal v Argentina61 the Ad hoc 
Committee imposed some limits to its attributions when they recognized that even if an 
annullable error is found (like Hirsh commented) the Committee has to have a certain 
amount of discretion when evaluates whether or not an award has to be annulled: 
“[I]t appears to be established than ad hoc committee has a certain measure of 
discretion as to whether to annul an award, even if an annullable error is found...”62.   
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In other words, ―the committee shall have the authority to annul the award”63. Therefore 
the dissolution of the award is not an obligation when a legal failure has been found on the 
award, it will remain at the complete discretion and the legal thinking of the annulment 
court whether or not to dissolute the award.  
This criteria was confirmed in CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina: 
“[T]he scope of this mandate allows annulment as an option only when certain 
specific condition exists ... the Committee cannot simple substitute its own view of 
the law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal”64 
While for commentators like Promod Nair, the Third Generation at ICISD ―has come in 
praise for successfully navigating a course between the Scylla of complete fairness and the 
Charybdis of absolute finality”65 for other investment expert is ―bad enough that tribunals 
made errors. It is worse that these errors cannot be corrected even after they are 
discovered‖, 66 because ICSID procedure does not provide any stage on the procedure 
where these legal mistakes can be retrieved. 
A second question arises from the behaviour of the Third Generation Committees: Is there a 
gap on ICSID procedure? If the Ad hoc Committee considers that there are some legal 
mistakes on the awards that cannot be amended because they exceed the function of the 
mechanism, then is that an indicator that there should be a procedure between the final 
award of the Arbitral Tribunal and the annulment of the Ad Hoc Committee capable of 
amending these errors? This Second question should be analysed on the Second Chapter 
(2.2-2.3).  
Despite the lack of precedents on the ICSID framework and the differences rendered on 
each generation, it can be concluded that a set of similar criteria were applied by the 
Committees among the 3 generations:  
 They have a narrow an limited mandate; 
 They cannot correct errors of law; 
 They enjoy certain degree of discretion; 
 They may reconstruct the reasons if the tribunal has failed to provide them; 
and  
 They may not automatically annul an award even of the tribunal makes a 
mistake in its search for appropriate law‖67 
Regardless of these set of criteria, the standards of the reasoning of the Ad hoc Committee 
is far from been clear. After several of annulment decisions, in 2010 raised the question of 
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the threshold of annulment proceedings which embraces Sempra v Argentina, Enron v 
Argentina, Helnan v Egypt68 and Vivendi v Argentina II.  
The cases of Sempra and Enron are cases under the BIT USA-Argentina and are a 
consequence of the financial crisis in Argentina. The concept of necessity was claimed by 
the State in both procedures and the Arbitral Tribunal in both cases equated the definition of 
necessity provided on BIT with the concept on necessity according to International Law 
standards. The approach made by Ad hoc committee in both cases is not coherent or 
compatible. On Sempra, the Ad hoc committee decided that necessity on the BIT cannot be 
the same ‗necessity‘ of the customary law - obviously in International Law necessity would 
require higher standards and the context cannot the be the same on International Law and 
Investment Law, thus the final award was annulled under the grounds of falling to apply the 
law.  In contrast, in Enron, the Committee agreed on the equity made by the Arbitral 
Tribunal between these two standards of necessity. However they fail to apply essential 
legal elements on the necessity defence such as if the implantation of these measures was 
the only way for Argentina ―to safeguard an essential security interest‖. 69 
The main criticisms at the time regarding the contrasting annulment decision in Sempra and 
Enron focused on the blurred limits on the Committees‟ faculties. There is no faculty granted 
in the Washington Convention, neither on the ICSID rules that allows the Committees to 
annul an award because of an error on the applied law - CMS v Argentina annulment 
decision is a clear example of not annulling an award on the grounds of an error of law.  
The annulment on Helnan v Egypt was partially granted under the grounds that the tribunal 
had manifestly exceeded its powers when it said that the investor should have required first 
an exhaustive assistance from its local courts before starting any procedure at ICSID. This 
decision was not within the scope of the criticisms like Enron or Sempra, actually, this 
decision was tagged as properly done under the faculties an Ad hoc committee possess. 
Then, Vivendi II appears on stage again but this time the criticisms concentrated no on the 
decision but on the Arbitral Tribunal. The Committee expressed very strong criticisms 
against the Arbitral Tribunal because one of the members of did not disclose its‘ position at 
the Board of a Swiss Bank that held shares in the Investor‘s Company (Vivendi). The 
annulment of the award was requested under the arguments of failing to fulfil with an 
essential rule of procedure and the Tribunal was then not properly constituted. The annul 
Committee strongly criticised the arbitrator who failed to disclose its position at the board 
arguing that the ICSID credibility was jeopardized. Despite the hard criticism to the 
unattended disclosure and the recognition of serious errors on the award, the Committee 
decided to do not warrant the annulment.  
Looking to the decisions made on Sempra and Enron, it is clear that the Ad hoc Committee 
needs guidelines regarding the limits of its‘ authority and the scope of its decisions. It is 
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common to see different outcomes when the parties or the applicable law are different, but 
in Sempra and Enron, parties and BITs involved were very similar, and the Ad hoc 
Committee expressed opposite legal arguments. Moreover, if the Committees are going to 
second guess tribunals‘ interpretation of facts and application of law, the annulment 
decisions are degenerating into an exercise of academic rivalry where the members of an 
annulment committee strive to prove they are better arbitrators than those whose awards 
are reviewing.70 In addition, it is becoming a frequent argument that ―there are errors on the 
awards- but we cannot amend them‖; this should raise even more concerns about a 
procedural gap on ICSID because the Centre was not created to render ―good but with 
errors-awards‖. An award not only affects the interest of an investor, it also affects those of 
a host Sate, usually developing countries, especially when they are deemed to pay on the 
awards substantial amounts of money.  
 With the description of the previous cases, we can have a better understanding of the 
developing jurisprudence in ICSID, and the procedural behaviour of the Ad hoc committee. 
The task of identifying the procedural gaps and failures of ICSID is not easy, it has to be done 
carefully and all elements should have to be taken into account, yet the previous framework is 
important to be understood completely in order to identify the procedural gaps, the effect of 
precedents, parties and the BITs regarding this procedural challenges and the possible 
solutions.71 
 
CHAPTER II 
2.1  Lack Of  ICSID Jurisprudence 
ICISD chain of decisions has set a roller-coaster threshold for annulment decisions, 
sometimes high and sometimes low and inaccurate. Moreover the annulment procedure has 
been confused with an appeals procedure72 creating a body of investment law unpredictable 
and incoherent.73 
 Stability and predictability are essential elements on mechanisms aiming to provide benefits 
for any modern economy. ICSID arbitration should not be the exception. The Centre, as the 
main investment arbitration institution in the world should contribute to have a more 
predictable framework which not varies from committee to committee. 
 Setting aside the relevant ICSID Generational cases, a high profile example of the need of 
having a stable framework are the inconsistent decisions in the SGS cases.74 Both cases, 
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involved a pre-shipment inspection services agreement and therefore the legal issues to 
decide were very similar, the Arbitral Tribunals had to decide the request of SGS to elevate 
the contractual claims to BIT claims as it is the propose of the umbrella clause. One 
important factor in the two cases was that the umbrella clauses was drafted slightly 
different. In the case of SGS v Pakistan the clause stated: ―shall constantly guarantee the 
observance of commitments‖75; whereas in the SGS v Philippines the relevant clause 
provided that the parties shall ―observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to specific 
investments‖. 76  The wording was evidently different yet the Arbitral Tribunals focused their 
efforts on understanding the literal meaning of the provision instead of going further and 
trying to understand the propose of umbrella clauses.  
 The Pakistan Tribunal issued the award first; they rejected the SGS‘s understanding of the 
umbrella clause. The Arbitral Tribunal argued that the word ―commitments‖ was not wide 
enough to include contractual claims. The award was available to the Philippines tribunal 
and yet the latter disagreed with the former, albeit the remark that the Tribunals “should 
seek to act consistently with each other”77. The Philippine‘s Tribunal went further than the 
mere grammatical interpretation of the award by reasoning that the clause ―means what it 
says”78 therefore a commitment or obligation to pay was included in the contract.  
 The SGS cases are not the only example. As mentioned earlier, in the case of Sempra and 
Enron; different tribunals reached different solutions even when the legal merits to solve 
were the same. In legal practice this is not something new and there is always going to be 
dissenting opinions, nevertheless, the actual status of ICSID does not have any path for 
solving this situation which is extremely concerning for the investment community. Judith 
Gill79 described three important issues in connection with the debate of inconsistent 
decisions. The first is predictability, this characteristic is important for parties and 
practitioners. Where a case turns on its facts, of course there is no case equal to another, 
but when the issues involved are similar legal issues expected to have an important degree 
of predictability, investors and States have the desire to predict the outcome of their cases 
and is not much comfort to them to learn that the answer to that crucial question may well 
depend on the constitution of the Tribunal or on purely linguistic differences rather than on 
legal facts. Audley Sheppard and Hugo Warner also share this concern, they expressed the 
view that if investment users, such as States, investors and practitioners are concerned 
about the different meanings of expropriation, jurisdiction or fair and equitable treatment; 
those differences  might be the result of  different arbitral tribunals perspectives.  
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 Gill, gives a very strong criticism to ICSID concerning a second element on the structure of 
precedents, which is reputation, not only for the Centre but also for the congruency on the 
reasoning of each Arbitral Tribunal. Gill expressed the concern that users of the system may 
become disenchanted by the decision making process if it is perceived as something of a 
lottery and the outcome of the decision is consequence of who is appointed as Arbitral 
Tribunal rather than of the legal issues of the case.80 
 Nevertheless, inconsistent decisions on investment arbitration should be an issue that does 
not need to be addressed, it should be seen as a fact of life and many of the decisions, 
while not formally having the status of a binding precedent, have persuasive effect on future 
disputes. This is so, for two reasons: (1) the situation by no means is unique to investment 
arbitration: a national court delivers non- consistent verdicts regularly. In England, for 
example, the question of whether specific words are needed to consider an arbitration 
agreement made in one contract as part of the terms of another contract was subject to 
differing approaches over several years following the Aughton Ltd v M F Kent Services 
decision. Inconsistent decisions (2) will give rise to one approach being generally more 
preferable than another and so it will be more adopted more frequently thereafter.81 In 
contrast, James Crawford82 considers that if there is a degree of inconsistency, both in 
terms of reasons that are given and, some would say, in terms of results reached as in the 
Vivendi Annulment and the Philippines v SGS decisions, then you can see inconsistency 
may be a problem.  
 Doak Bishop agrees on seeing inconsistency, as something the investment community 
should learn how to deal with. Bishop argues that inconsistency should be seen as a good 
thing on an appropriate level. Investment International arbitration is a new area in law that 
needs to properly evolve over a period of time. Moreover, actual Ad hoc committees are 
carefully reviewing the previous mistakes made earlier decisions; they are refining the law 
from one case to the next one. Unfortunately, this comments made by Bishop were made in 
2004, he predicted a positive and careful behaviour of the Committees to the annulment 
activity, which unfortunately with Sempra and Enron annulments, the positive criticism of 
Bishop cannot remain valid.83 
 A set of questions arises from analysing the absence of an eloquent ICSID jurisprudence: 
Why the lack of precedents is so important regarding the annulment activity? How the 
existence of a consistent and predictable judgment criteria will be retrieve the procedural 
gaps on ICSID? VV Veeder84 has made the most important contribution by explaining why 
the lack of precedents affects directly the annulment activity. He considers that as long as 
there is an important lack of consistency on the outcomes of the ICSID awards, especially 
when the disputes come from the same BIT (Sempra and Enron, are a good example) or 
the same national law, annulment is always going to be desirable and the principle of finality 
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will be the most unwanted principle on the investment arena. It was once thought that the 
absence of finality could create a defective processes. Today, that appeal seems to have 
done not harm but much good to ICSID general reputation and popularity. It is for the 
common good of the parties and investment arbitration generally.85 
 How can we solve the lack of inconsistency among ICSID decisions?  Practitioners prefer to 
remain positive towards inconsistency rather to give solutions to the lack of precedents. This 
is not surprising at all considering they are the ones participating on the tribunals and 
committees that render all the different decisions catalogued as inconsistent, however trying 
to reach a consensus among them is a hard task.  Nigel Blackaby86 takes a risk and offers a 
solution for inconsistency. Blackaby suggests the possibility of creating a power in ICSID to 
consolidate cases where similar issues of law or fact are in question. He further suggests 
looking at the possibility of bringing a type of class action (subject perhaps to separate 
assessment of jurisdictional issues) where a single industry is involved. This consolidation 
has been implemented in some Argentinean cases, that will be disused in this chapter.  
 When parties do not have precedents and they have an award not favourable to them, the 
possibility of annulment comes as one of the first thoughts; obviously more for the 
practitioners, when they have an award not favourable to their clients the annulet 
mechanism becomes a very attractive litigation technique. The relationship between the 
lack of precedents and annulment activity is stronger of what it seems. Precedents on ICSID 
would give a filter to access the annulment mechanism, in other words, if an award is 
grounded under consistent precedents, the chances of annulment for the award would be 
reduced on a significant percentage. 
 The solution of last resort, yet it might be the most effective, is also suggested by Blackaby 
who considers the possibility of an Appeal Tribunal broader than the current annulment 
process, which seems to be an attractive solution in the pursuit of ensuring some degree of 
consistence. He emphasizes the following idea:  
―[A]rbitration as a process without appeal might sit well with the exigencies of 
commerce is reconsidered in the field where there are states in question and where 
citizens of those states will have to finance the ultimate payment of damages awards 
from taxation. A narrow appeal on specific points of law could avoid the risk of 
incoherent jurisprudence.‖87 
 This possibility leads us to the questions: is ICSID ready to have a Court of appeal? Could 
an Appellate body solve the problems and the procedural challenges presented?88  
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2.2  The Ad Hoc Committee.  Court of Appeal or Court of Annulment? 
The concepts of Court of Appeal and Court of Annulment are usually mentioned when the 
reasoning of the Ad hoc Committee is being revised. The main criticism concerning ICSID 
and the mechanisms of appeal and annulment are two:(i) the consequences of the faculties 
exercised by the annulment committee and (ii) if it is time for an ICSID Appellate Structure 
that contributes to the finality, efficiency and consistent decisions of ICSID framework?  
 
Before getting into these criticisms, it is important to understand the meaning of annulment 
and appeal.89 Annulment is ―the act of nullifying or making it void‖90 in contrast, an Appeal is 
―a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority […] and it 
can be also named as a review proceeding‖.91 It can be said that the consequences of an 
annulment decision are concerning the procedural legitimacy whereas an appeal decision is 
not only the review of the procedural legitimacy but also its substantive accuracy.92 
 
One of the problematic consequences of the legal reasoning of the Ad hoc committees is 
the blurred line of acting as Court of Annulment or as a Court of Appeal. Ad hoc committees 
often emphasise that their task is only regarding annulment and their actions are different 
from appeal, although decisions of the Committees have not been coherent with it.93 
 
Unfortunately, annulment tribunals have not always complied with the text and sprit of 
Article 52.94 This is because decisions rendered by the Ad hoc Committees seems to go out 
of the scope of Article 52 by having a broader conception of annulment.95 The best example 
to illustrate this situation can be seen when cases like Klockner I and Amco I created big 
concerns since both Committees revised the merits of the case causing a confusion 
between annulment and appeal.96 As explained earlier, the following ICSID Generations 
remained alleviated and steady by rendering more eloquent decisions and tried to be more 
careful about annulling awards for trivial reasons.97  
 
The Second consequence of the faculties exercised by the Annulment Tribunals, is the total 
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annulment of the award ergo the total destruction of the award. In the best scenario, the 
total annulment of the award will permit the Claimant to submit again the entire dispute, but 
it can happen that the Ad hoc Committee annuls the decision partially generating not only a 
res judicata effect but also a possible resubmission of a ‗partial unsolved dispute‟ to a new 
ICSID tribunal.  
 
For a better understanding, Michael Reisman gave the best description of how an Ad hoc 
Committee can generate these problematic consequences. Going back to basics, 
Reisman98 uses as reference the AMCO I annulment decision. As mentioned earlier, in this 
case the Ad Hoc Committee partially annulled the award. Thus, according to the ICISID 
arbitration rules the dispute can be submitted to a new tribunal. This new tribunal had the 
task to narrow or at least tried to narrow the scope of its jurisdiction. A questions arises 
here, is this new Arbitral Tribunal in front of a new dispute? The answer is no, it would be 
naive to think the dispute will start on its most pure status. Moreover, to try to solve a 
dispute with a previous partial res judicata effect transforms any ICISD tribunal into a Court 
of Second Instance. As we will see on the solutions proposed by investment experts, 
Reisamn recommends a sort of guidelines to the subsequent arbitral tribunals and suggest 
them to have a broad and inclusive concept of res judicata.99 
 
This is a very philosophical analysis, in practice, the res judicata consequences do not 
affect the procedural mechanism of ICSID, certainly the hard task is only for the new Arbitral 
Tribunal. It has to cut up what is already res judicata and what is yet to be decided. In this 
case, where the Ad hoc committee made a partial annulment, the possible solutions to 
study the entire dispute again, there is nothing on the ICSID Rules, neither in the 
Washington Convention that prohibits the new Arbitral Award to study the resubmission of 
the dispute from zero. Nevertheless the nature of this new Arbitral Tribunal regarding it 
status as Second Court or Court of Appeal remains in doubt.  
 
The Court of Appeal on ICSID is also been discussed from another perspective. The early 
stages of this discussion have been attributed to Professor Lauterpacht,100 but since 2004101 
and lately with Sempra and Enron the discussion has become stronger. Commentators 
have wondered if is time for an ICSID reform that contributes to the finality principle. An 
Appeal Court is one of the most ambitious solutions for ICSID procedural challenges, this 
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would retrieve not only the gap on the procedural mechanism but also it would bring 
consistency on the decisions rendered. First, it is important to understand what are the 
possible benefits that could bring an appeal mechanism and then the obstacles that could 
be brought by a possible implementation. 
 
Uncertain ICSID awards can affect the predictability and reliability of the mechanism of 
dispute settlement.102 Any legal dispute mechanism should provide to its users a control 
system capable to amend the possible legal and procedural failures made on the awards. 
When an award is rendered, two characteristics are expected: justice and finality. 
Nowadays ICSID might offer a delayed justice but is far from offer finality. Nevertheless, we 
should know that investment arbitration has recently emerged and therefore ―breakdowns in 
legal controls are not necessary calamities or systematically dysfunctional‖,103 mistakes are 
necessary in order to develop precedents, this task would be easier for ICSID if could count 
with an Appeal Control because it has been said that ―all contemporary arbitration must 
invent its own control system‖.104 
The necessity of an ICSID Appeal Court can be sustained with different arguments. For 
instance, the Ad hoc Committee cannot contribute the finality principle just because they do 
not have the powers to correct the tribunal‘s awards with a more accurate decision.105 
Therefore the dispute is not solved, it remains pending for a new tribunal. In this concern, it 
should be important to considerate the success of the WTO appellate body. It consists of 
seven people where three of whom sit on any particular case, the appellate process is 
limited to issues of law and legal interpretations and they have the authority to grant an 
upholding, modification or reversion of the legal findings and conclusions of the panel. Also, 
timing is important on the appellate process, which normally would take 60-90 days.106 The 
experience on the WTO suggests the benefits of having a permanent Appeal Body capable 
of doing the scrutiny of the issues concerning jurisdiction, admissibility, fundamental errors 
of procedure that affect directly the outcome of the award, also would be important that this 
mechanism would be able to review matters such as due process issues like Article V of the 
New York Convention.107 
A brave proposal is the one that suggests the implementation of an appeal mechanism 
as an additional facility. This means, that no need of amendment has to be done to the 
Washington Convention, neither to the ICSID rules, although it would be contradictory 
with Art 53 of the Convention, which provides that final decisions are not subject to any 
appeal.  
 Before explaining all the obstacles the implementation of an appeal court might bring, it is 
important to describe the arguments suggesting that a Court of Appeal, on ICSID, can solve 
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the procedural breakdowns. The first benefit would be consistency, the Secretariat has 
recognised that an appeal mechanism ―would be intended to foster coherence and 
consistency in the case law‖,108 the establishment of a Court of Annulment will unite a 
seemingly fragmented body.109 The best example of ICSID lack of consistency, are the 
recently Sempra and Enron cases, as mentioned before these two different decisions were 
rendered within the same legal system, (US- Argentina BIT).  These opposite decisions 
have left not only the investors but also the investment community with the feeling that is no 
the law that determines the dispute but the reasoning of the Tribunal members. The same 
exercise can be applied to the former SGS cases, although in these cases the BITs were 
different, the decisions rendered did not concern strictly on the law but it depended on the 
legal and literal interpretation of the umbrella clauses made by the Arbitral Tribunals.  
An appeal mechanism would contribute to more uniform standard and interpretation of 
Investment Law, ergo consistent decisions? The answer is yes. If two different arbitral 
tribunals rendered different decisions, regarding similar or almost identical legal facts. A 
court of Appeal will produce consistent bodies of case law, for example, which decision of 
the SGS cases should prevail in the case the parties could submit the decision to an appeal, 
also it will provide to the investor an environment of confidence towards the ICSID 
arbitration process. In addition, consistency will bring fairness; similar cases should be dealt 
with similar criteria in order to provide an accurate standard for concepts such as umbrella 
clauses. An important argument that should be mentioned against an appeal court 
concerning the principle of inconsistency is the approach criteria of ICISID as an individual 
approach system, ―ICSID is there for the parties, and not for interested observes keen on 
systematic consistency‖110 this is to say that ICISD objective is to produce a solution only to 
the parties involved in the dispute, rather than give identical results in different cases.  
The second argument supporting a Court of Appeal is the pursuit of accuracy on the 
decisions rendered by the arbitral tribunal. Decisions will be more accurate if the go trough 
an appeal or review by a higher court.  
―[A]n arbitrator can cloak profoundly unfair or wrongful conduct in the guise of 
meticulous procedural formalities, and only the possibility of some substantive 
review on the merits can effectively check such conduct.”111 
An appellate court would have the opportunity to focus only on the controversial issues 
between the parties that the Arbitral Tribunal could not solve. A fully reasoned decision 
would be rendered in order to solve the controversial arguments. Undoubtedly, a second 
revision to a dispute is the best filter to eliminate errors on the award.112 
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Another argument against the implementation of a court of appeal is finality.  It has been 
argued that to submit a decision rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal to an Appeal Court might 
delay the arbitral process. But, is not finality already distorted with the actual gap on ICSID? 
It has to be understood that the principle of finality has a different meaning in Investment 
Arbitration Law. Complexity is higher because of the elements involved: important amounts 
of money are claimed, a State is always involved as a party, the applicable law is usually 
international treaties. Parties may not want finality, specially the looser party. The result 
could be so important to them, is a big possibility that both of them want the result of the 
award to be reviewable.113 An argument against this is provided by Christian J. Tams who 
says that the decision in favour of a second level of dispute settlement would also risk 
undermining the authority of the first level decision. But is not this happening with the Vivendi 
II decision? Where the Ad hoc committee hardly criticized the reasoning of the Arbitral 
Tribunal concerning the non-disclosure of the relationship of one of the members of the 
arbitral tribunal with a Swiss Bank shareholder of the claimant? The appeal court solution 
has to be observed as a positive solution to fix ICSID fissures. 
The implementation is the biggest obstacle of a Court of Appeal. Amendments or ratification 
to the ICSID Convention requires the approval of all 157 member countries, and is far 
reaching to get the consensus of all the members. For that reason, the implementation of an 
appeal stage on ICSID can be done in two feasible ways. The first one is to agree an appeal 
procedure on the same document parties agreed ICSID jurisdiction, the best example is 
CAFTA, which will be analysed in the next chapter. Alternatively, ICSID members in 
pursuant of an appeal mechanism can agree a soft law document such as a Protocol.114  
The implantation of an appeal court in a protocol or in treaties will clearly circumvent Article 
53 and there is no legal impediment that could prevent the Parties on doing so.115  
 
2.3  The Gaps on ICSID Annulment Procedure 
The gap on ICSID can be found on the radical options offered by ICSID rules after an award 
has been rendered. As mentioned before the available remedies are soft and only useful to 
correct formal mistakes. In contrast, if a substantive mistake needs to be retrieved the 
option available is the annulment. That is a drastic measure, especially if most of the 
content of the award is correct and only partial amendments have to be made.  
An example, that deservers to be mentioned is the ICC arbitration rules. According to Article 
27 of these rules, before the award is final, a draft has to be sent to the ICC Court, this 
Court can make not only formal modifications to the award but also the Court can draw the 
attention of the Arbitral Tribunal to substantive matters that should be amended, 
notwithstanding the Arbitral Tribunal is free to make the changes or not. By comparing the 
procedures offered in different arbitral institutions it is easier to see the gap on ICSID. If this 
mechanism seems hard to implement in ICSID, it would be important to consider, if the 
Secretary General can make prima facie scrutiny of the request of annulment before 
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constituting the committee, just as its‘ obligation to analyse the jurisdiction when a request 
of arbitration has been filed to the Centre. Again, the obstacle of reforming the Convention 
is faced, but it would be a slight change that should be considered.  
Another gap, less obvious, is the lack of a provision that permits the parties to submit a 
motion to the Arbitral Tribunal in order to have an award reconsidered. If the arbitral tribunal 
can reconsider formal mistakes why not give it the power to amend substantive mistakes, 
after the wave of annulments of 2010 a new solution for the ICSID gap was proposed. This 
solution suggests the possibility to grant to the Arbitral Tribunal powers similar to those 
granted to the judges of the U.S. Federal District Court. This would permit to the tribunal to 
review important facts that were missed in good faith maybe due to the complexity of the 
dispute. The response expected by granting these faculties to the tribunal is reducing 
failures of legal reasoning on the awards.116 This solution, will also defeat the increasing 
concern by States and Investors not only about losing a dispute on ICSID but of losing due 
to errors in the award that cannot be amended or rectified. The second concern can be 
avoided by widening the faculties of the Arbitral Tribunal, not permitting that the losing 
parties request the annulment of the award in order to avoid an immediate compliance with 
the award. 
To grant these faculties to the ICSID Arbitral Tribunal might produce more benefits than an 
appeal court. An amend made by the arbitral tribunal would take less time than appointing a 
new (appeal) tribunal, obviously the expenses of the procedure will be lower if the mistakes 
of the award are solved in one instance. Unlike an appellate body, the arbitral tribunal does 
not have to study the merits of the dispute again.117 Going beyond the problems regarding 
the implementation of these faculties, the intention here is to describe real powers the 
Arbitral Tribunal could have under ICSID that the drafters, maybe intentionally did not 
provide. For sure to introduce these faculties to the actual ICSID arbitration rules is almost 
impossible especially due to the consensus needed from all member states. Accordingly, it 
seems more feasible the implementation of an Appeal Court on the Investment Treaties 
such it was made in the Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA). 
 
2.4  The Impact of the Investment Treaties on the Annulment Activity 
The current problematic of implementing solutions on the ICSID framework has lead to find 
new possibilities within the investment infrastructure. Such is the case of the investment 
treaties and the United States. 
One of the most important principles in arbitration is party autonomy. This autonomy is 
clearly exerted when States agree to join a treaty. The agreements made on these types of 
international bodies of law should be respected (with the exception of mandatory laws) and 
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applied by any arbitral tribunal, in case a dispute arises. Therefore, States have seen on the 
investment treaties an answer to the issues of consistency and efficiency under ICSID. 
In 2002, after some threats to the U.S. sovereignty and NAFTA experiences,118 the 
American Congress signed the U.S. Trade Act119 with the aim of improving fair trade 
standards and investment stability. This Act promotes the implementation of an appeal 
mechanism in subsequent trade agreements signed by the United States. Thus, the 
government started to negotiate some Trade Agreements with Jordan, Morocco, Peru, 
Australia, Chile, Singapore, Central America and the Caribbean, among other countries.120  
The aim of this appeal mechanism is to achieve coherence in all U.S. investment treaties 
(Free Trade Agreements),121 nowadays the CAFTA is the best example of implementation 
of a Court of Appeal into an Investment Treaty converting the previous theoretical 
discussions into a new dynamic in the arbitration mechanisms. The mentioned treaty 
includes the following provision: 
“[W]ithin three months of entry into force of the Agreement, the FTC shall 
establish a negotiating group to develop an appellate body or similar 
mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under the Investment 
Chapter of the Agreement. Such appellate body or similar mechanism shall be 
designed to provide coherence to the interpretation of the investment provisions 
in the Agreement.” 122 
The implementation of the appellate body has to be done through an amendment to the 
agreement, in order to do this, the negotiating group has to consider: (1) the limits and the 
scope of the review, (2) transparency, (3) the relationship between the applicable law and 
the arbitration rules, and (4) the relationship between the domestic and international law.123 
As usually happens with ambitious solutions, it seems everything stayed in good 
intentions, the discussion has been in stand-by for some years, the glow has gone off 
regarding an appellate mechanism.124 This is because, a non-ICSID award is subject to be 
set-aside in national courts, unless the procedural law provides for a ―self- contained‖ 
challenge mechanism. The appellate mechanism on CAFTA would need to adopt the role 
                                                          
118
 D.A. Gantz; "Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican Republic-United 
States Free Trade Agreement" [2009]TDM 4 (2009) 
119
 Barton Legum, The Introduction of an Appellate Mechanism: the U.S.  Trade Act of 2002 in 
Emmanuel Galliard and  Yas Banifatemi (eds) ( n 17),  Barton Legum, Visualizing an Appellate 
System in?, [2005]  2/2 BIICL , and Gantz  ( n 120) 
 
121
 Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002   S. 2102(b)(3)(G)(iv). 
122
 Anex 10 –F CAFTA 2. 
123
 D.A GANTZ (n 120) 135. 
124
 Melinda Hodgson, Elements of architecture for a CAFTA appellate mechanism. ABA Fall meeting 
2009 'Towards a CAFTA Appellate Mechanism" on 
<http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fapp
s.americanbar.org%2Fintlaw%2Ffall09%2Fmaterials%2FHodgsonCAFTAAppellateMechanism.pdf&e
i=h1RBTtn9FMTChAe54NzBCQ&usg=AFQjCNFR8SSpJ71G5CZWEudYGW2-MKoawA> accessed 
on 10 June 2011.  
REVIST@ e – Mercatoria  Volumen 10, Número 2 (julio – diciembre 
2011) 
(Rev. e-mercatoria) 
 
 
192 Universidad Externado de Colombia. Departamento de Derecho Comercial                     
 
of the Ad hoc Committee in order to serve a sort of one-stop shop for purposes of review of 
the arbitral awards. The actual status of CAFTA members (also signatories of ICSID) can 
be seen perfectly on the case Pac Rim, were the applicable law is the Investment Law of 
El Salvador and CAFTA. 125 
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2.5  Same Parties, Several Annulments? Or Different Parties, Several Annulments? 
The task of understanding the weaknesses of ICSID can be studied better in the contest of 
the Argentinean experience but also under this perspective solutions can be found. This is 
because when it comes to scrutinize the performance of the ICSID Arbitral Tribunals the 
Argentinian experience deserves to be revised. Certainly the government of Argentina has 
an opinion regarding the procedural challenges ICSID might have, it can be said that ICSID 
has played an essential part on settling Argentinean disputes after the financial crisis.  
The figures say that from 331 cases ICSID has administrated since January 2002, 
Argentina has been respondent in 49 of them. Almost half of all the new ICISID cases 
registered have named Argentina as defendant. Now, there are 26 cases pending to be 
solved where the State is been judged.126 
First of all, it is important to understand the reasons that produced the Argentinian crisis. In 
the early 1980s, Argentina suffered from an unstable economy and foreign investors were 
not interested in the country. A set of financial reforms were made in order to attract 
investment; the first one was the fixing1 to 1 the Argentine currency to US Dollar, and the 
second; the privatization of public services through an international public tendering 
process. These measures (provisionally) succeeded; US$23 billion approx. entered to the 
Argentine Treasure. Transnational companies started to play a role in the Argentine 
infrastructure: CMS Energy, Pan American, Gas Natural, Endesa of Spain, National Grid of 
the UK, Vivendi and ENRON among others. Nevertheless, Argentina remained on a 
permanent recession and in January 2002 the ―Emergency Law‖ was applied. The most 
important effect was that the Peso fell dramatically reaching four Argentinean Pesos to one 
US Dollar. The sum of all these events were new in the history of Investment Arbitration 
Treaties, all the investors with assets in Argentina considered the value of their investment 
was affected severely and they looked for the dispute resolution mechanism in order to 
claim damages to Argentina.127 
The wave of claims against Argentina was a fact that ICSID was not prepared for, this was 
the first time a phenomenon like this occurred to an arbitration institution, which undoubtedly 
has led to test the system to its limits. First of all ICSID had to address the issue of State 
measures in breach of core promises and the alleged concept of ‗necessity‘ which has 
caused so many contradictory opinions among the investment experts.  
Tribunals have made several judgments to the Argentinean measures taken during the 
crisis. The responsibility of these Tribunals is double; they have to render carefully decisions 
that cannot be appealed in case a mistake is found on the reasoning. On of the biggest 
problems of administrating cases with the same party (Argentina) is that most of the 
disputes shared similar facts,128 with 49 cases the possibility of having 49 different 
outcomes on the award is possible. Decisions are exposed and vulnerable if consistency 
and coherency is expected. There is a concern that inconsistency will provide the best 
excuse for the host state of the investment to refuse the enforcement of the award arguing 
                                                          
126
 ICSID Secretariat (n102) , Nigel Blackaby  (n 85). 
127
 ibid Blackaby. 
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that it ―is politically unacceptable to enforce inconsistent decisions‖.129 As mentioned before, 
inconsistency and lack of coherency among the awards is not per se a problem, the concern 
is addressed when similar standards are been revised and the outcomes are the different. 
Umbrella clause, fair and equitable treatment, necessity; is expected that these concepts 
are similar within the framework of a country.  
ICSID has been tested with important amounts of caseload. Unlike the recent criticisms to 
the annulment activity, this was the first challenge the institution faced and tried to solve, by 
consolidating cases130 were the dispute arises in the similar sector or with similar investors 
by encouraging arbitrators to sit in more than one arbitral tribunal.131 Moreover,  ICISID has 
encouraged the coordination of similar proceedings, as in the water concession cases,132 
where a similar Arbitral Tribunal was constituted and a single procedural hearing was fixed 
for all the cases. This consolidation of cases in ICSID was well accepted among the 
investment practitioners. Nevertheless, it has not been successfully implemented. In the 
cases were an identical arbitral tribunal was appointed, one of the arbitrators presented his 
resignation from the tribunal (Cammuzzi case), while the award of Sempra could not avoid 
the wave of annulments in 2010. At first glance, the consolidation seems to be an efficient 
system to unify criteria and efficient timing on the arbitral procedure. Nevertheless, 
consolidation is only a partial solution and does not solve substantially the problem of 
annulments, this ‗piecemeal‖ offered for the arguments looking for an appeal procedure.  
With the three cases annulled in 2010, where Argentina was party, the investment 
community discovered that consolidation was solving just part of the problem, and 
confirmed the argument that is time for a reform in ICSID. 
The last decisions annulled involving Argentina proved that ICISD needs an integral re-
design. The technique of consolidation is working in commercial arbitration when ―parties 
have submitted to arbitration arising from different contracts‖, parties also seek to join 
proceedings133 as consequence of the multiparty participation in commercial transactions. 
Should be time as well for ICSID to sets clear rules for joinder, multiparty and or 
consolidation proceedings, in some extent this might look for a more uniform legal 
reasoning. It should bear in mind that this is only part of the solution; an award 
consequence of joinder proceedings can also be annulled with the actual procedural gap.  
 
                                                          
129
 ibid. 
130
 Carlos Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, Multiplicity of Claims under BITs [2005]  2/2 BIICL, Ricardo 
Ortiz, Los tratados bilaterales de inversiones y las demandas en el CIADI:la experiencia Argentina a 
comienzos del siglo XXI,  Red por la Justicia Social en las Inversiones Globales on 
http://es.justinvestment.org/reportes-y-analisis/ accessed on 09 August 2011. 
131
 Sempra and Cammuzi shared identical tribunals.  Pan American Energy and BP Exploration 
cases with a single tribunal.  
132
 Vivendi Cases (n 64). 
133
 Julian Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kroll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) 406. 
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Chapter III 
3.1  Investment Community.  Brief Proposals and Silent Solutions. 
This paper has reviewed the annulment road of ICSID. The investment community has used 
any possible chance to expresses its approval or not to this unique arbitration system and 
its challenges. If we are allowed to do consensus, it can be said that the proposals can be 
allocated in five groups: 
a) To amplify the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal.  
b) A Court of Appeal 
c) Guidelines for the Ad hoc committee  
d) Prima facie analysis of the annulment by the Secretary- General  
e) Case law in the form of precedents  
The implementation of any of these proposals has to be done through: 
(1) An amendment on the Washington Convention, as well as ICSID Rules.  
(2) A Protocol signed by all the Member Countries 
(3) Creation of Appeal Facility Rules – but as mentioned earlier it clash with Art 53 
Washington Convention. 
(4) Inserting an Appeal mechanism on the Investment Treaties  
 
The Silent Solutions 
Two solutions, outside ICSID procedure, have been offered for the investment community 
although have not been strongly discussed. The essential characteristic of the silent 
solutions is that they do not contradict the provision of Art 53 of the Convention. 
 
3.2  The International Court Of Justice 
The chaos of implementation of all the possible solutions to fill the gap on ICSID procedure 
has lead experts to seek alternatives outside the investment scope. The Washington 
Convention in Art 6 gives the first solution where Sates members can request the assistant 
of The International Court of Justice (ICJ) when a dispute arises from the interpretation or 
application of the Washington Convention. The International Court of Justice is seen as the 
―highest international tribunal‖, therefore its hierarchy and reputation can assist to the ICSID 
proceeding.  
This suggestion is strengthened by the CMS v Argentina case where the Arbitral Tribunal 
did frequent references to the case Gabcikovo Nagymaros thus respecting the implicit high 
hierarchy of the International Court of Justice. It should not be understood however that the 
ICJ role substitutes the proposal of an appeal court, but it can review disputes arisen from 
the violations made based on errors the interpretation of an investment treaty. The 
interpretation treaty conflict should be a State – State dispute, therefore the type of claims 
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made by a State might differ for the ones an investors usually request and creativity should 
be applied on the legal reasoning presented to the Court.134 
 
The European Court of Justice 
This is a more regional solution rather than one applicable to all ICISID members. It is 
attractive but it will only benefit a reduced percentage of the investment users. The 
preliminary mechanism offered by the ECJ, function as in interim measure in the ICSID 
proceedings. If an Arbitral Tribunal under ICSID has a conflict on interpreting: previous 
decisions of ICSID tribunals or concerning the interpretation of a treaty. While the ECJ is 
clarifying the conflictive interpretation, the ICSID proceeding should remain in pause, until 
the decision is rendered. The contribution of the ECJ would be directly benefitted to have 
ICSID awards with less inconsistencies and law fragmentation would be reduced 
significantly.135 Some administrative issues should be discussed, such as whether the 
parties can request to the Tribunal for an ECJ clarification, or it should be discussed the 
outcome of the ECJ decision should be binding. It would be better if the Arbitral Tribunal has 
the discretion regarding to the abovementioned requests. it.136, maybe if there is an 
European-ICSID-decisions, they can be precedents de facto by all the other investment 
users. 
                                                          
134
Art 92 of the United Nations Charter. A detailed proposal is given by  Chrisitian J. Tams in (n 87) 
223. 
135
Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 
[2006] 2 TDM ,  23. 
136
 G. Laufman-Kohler, In search of transparency and consistency: ICSID reform proposal,[2005]  2/5 
TDM. 
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Conclusions  
Several factors are involved in the international investment activity; the possibility of having 
a dispute between investors and the host-country of that investment is always a latent 
possibility. In response to the lack of a reliable forum for investors and Sates, the World 
Bank created the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
Washington Convention, which rapidly had a significant approval counting with more than 
150 contracting Sates. 
The Washington Convention offers an arbitration mechanism specialized on administrating 
disputes arising from an investment. As any other relevant arbitration institution, ICSID 
offers a set of clear rules that guide the parties trough the procedure. Nevertheless, this 
arbitration procedure offers a ―self-contained system‖ due to the fact that, unlike other non-
ICSID awards, they can be challenged in National Courts; ICSID awards can only be 
subject to the remedies provided within the Rules.  
Most of the remedies are considered ―soft‖ remedies and are only useful when ―technical‖ 
mistakes are found in the final awards. However, only if the award contains a serious 
violation under Art 52(1) of the Convention, the consequence is the annulment of the award 
by an Ad hoc committee. The consequences of annulling an award is that the dispute can 
be resubmitted to the Centre on an unlimited number of times, this affects drastically the 
principle of finality, which should guarantee any arbitration proceedings. Moreover, the 
annulment activity on ICSID has been measured by Three Generations, and recently four 
awards were annulled without fulfilling any of the criteria previously established on the 
former generations.  Experts attribute this to different factors yet along this paper is clearly 
understood that the biggest problem on ICSDI procedure is the existing gap after an award 
is rendered and before the annulment of the Ad hoc committee. Annulment is a drastic 
measure and there is no option to review the award after is rendered.  Furthermore, 
features such as the lack of precedents and guidelines to the Committee, plus frequent 
confusions between a court of appeal and a court annulment made by the Ad hoc 
Committee affects substantially the performance of the institution.  
The problems of ICISD do not stop here, the solutions offered count with a wide range of 
complexity in the implementation. A substantial change on the procedure (such as broader 
faculties to the Arbitral Tribunal, prima facie of the annulment request by the Secretary 
General or the creation of a Court of Appeal) requires the amendment of the Washington 
Convention, and since the consent is required from all the signatory members, the 
investment and academic community looks pessimistic in the task of achieving consensus.  
There are other possibilities that do not require an inside change of the Convention such as 
the elaboration of guidelines for the Ad Committee in order to enhance coherency in their 
decisions as well as drawing the line between appeal and annulment functions. A protocol is 
also a viable option, but the content of it should be carefully drafted in order to avoid 
contradicting any provision in the Convention, especially if the objective of the Protocol is a 
Court of Appeal.  
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The Argentina factor, obliged the ICSID staff to be creative and use the rules the best they 
could, and consolidation seems a good solution, nevertheless is only a partial solution, and 
it cannot stop the annulment activity per se. The development of Free Trade Agreement, 
should be observed, the Pac Rym case pending on ICSID can be the beginning of a new 
Appeal Investment mechanism, we must remain vigilant on this era of new US Treaties and 
its contribution to the finality and coherency principles.   
The silent solutions, should be exhaustively discussed, specially the option offered by the 
International Court of Justice, the claims made by the State- representing the investor 
should contain more than creativity, not only the State has to really prove a violation made 
to the country. While the European Court of Justice is a tool that should be used by the 
ICSID European users, in order to generate consistency and EU-ICSID precedents.  
When ICSID was designed, had the best intentions to contribute to the investment field and 
provide for a balance to the investors and developing countries. The aim should not be 
forgotten: the annulment history remains pending, and the creativity of the investment 
community should answer the wakeup call.    
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